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1   Introduction 
 
For the last couple of decades, there has been a renewed interest among philosophers 
of mind in the theory of consciousness elaborated by Franz Brentano (1838-1917). Two 
approaches can be distinguished. The first approach appeals to Brentano’s intuitions 
in order to cope with current issues about consciousness (see, e.g., Thomasson 2000; 
Hossack 2002; Kriegel 2003; Smith 2004). The second approach aims at giving a system-
atic reconstruction of Brentano’s own theory (see, e.g., Hossack 2006; Borsato 2009a; 
Kriegel 2018a, b; Textor 2006, 2017a, b).1 The two approaches are perfectly compatible, 
but still differ in nature. In this paper, I will follow the second one. Even though I will 
focus on Brentano’s statements, I will not discuss them in chronological order, nor will 
I try to decide when Brentano changed his mind. From an exegetical point of view, all 
I intend to do is to identify the different interpretations of Brentano’s account and 
decide which is the most faithful one. The goal is to discuss both their compatibility 
with other claims of Brentano and their theoretical implications. 
The gist of Brentano’s theory of consciousness is the claim of the “double relation of 
the mental” (Doppelbeziehung des Psychischen; Brentano 1995b, p. 27)―roughly, the 
claim that every mental phenomenon involves an intentional relation to something 
distinct from itself, and an intentional relation to itself.2 Accordingly, Brentano distin-
guishes between “primary object” and “secondary object” (e.g., Brentano 1995a, p. 98) 
and speaks of “primary consciousness” and “secondary consciousness” (e.g., Brentano 
1995a, p. 121) respectively. Consider hearing a sound (Brentano’s favourite example of 
an ordinary mental event): the sound is said to be the primary object of the hearing 
because, “according to its nature,” it is “prior” to the hearing. The priority in question 
is explained by Brentano in terms of conceivability: a “presentation” (Vorstellung) of 
the sound without a presentation of the hearing is conceivable, whereas a presentation 
of the hearing without a presentation of the sound is not. Thus, Brentano says, our 
hearing is first and foremost directed towards the sound, and is directed towards itself 
only “incidentally and additionally.”3 
Brentano’s writings themselves show that the claim that there is a double relation 
stands in need of a systematic treatment. The systematic reconstruction of Brentano’s 
theory that has received the most attention is what I refer to as the identity reconstruc-
tion (see notably Textor 2017a, b; Kriegel 2018a, b). It says that secondary consciousness 
and the mental phenomenon it is about are one and the same. Crucially, it has been 
claimed that this thesis is the only one that makes the theory immune to what Brentano 
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considers the main threat to it, namely, the duplication of the primary object (see Textor 
2017a, b). In Brentano’s eyes, a theory of consciousness should not entail that we al-
ways perceive sounds, colours, and the like twice. In what follows, however, I argue 
that the identity reconstruction is untenable and defend an alternative one, which I call 
the unity reconstruction.4 On this reconstruction, secondary consciousness is a real part 
of the mental phenomenon it is about, and hence is distinct from it. I contend that the 
thesis of the unity reconstruction does not in itself lead to the duplication of the pri-
mary object; what should be blamed is rather a controversial thesis about the inten-
tional structure of secondary consciousness―a thesis that Brentano first introduces and 
then rejects, unlike the thesis that secondary consciousness is a real part of the mental 
phenomenon it is about, which he maintained throughout his career. 
There are reasons to believe that an examination of this issue will yield something 
more than simply a possible advancement in Brentano scholarship. Indeed, a glance at 
the current literature is sufficient to see that the problems Brentano ran into in studying 
the anatomy of the mind might also threaten contemporary views such as higher-order 
theories and structured self-representationalism (see, e.g., Rosenthal 2005; Kriegel 
2009), for on such theories, states like hearing a sound are conscious in virtue of being 
the object of a second-order mental state.  
The paper will proceed as follows. In Section 2, I focus on the claim of the double 
relation of the mental. In Section 3, I identify and discuss three reconstructions of Bren-
tano’s theory: the identity reconstruction (Section 3.1), the constituency reconstruction 
(Section 3.2), and the unity reconstruction (Section 3.3). Section 4 is devoted to the 
threat of the duplication of the primary object. Section 5 suggests the moral which con-
temporary theorists should draw from the discussion. 
 
2   Preliminaries: the double relation claim 
 
Let us start with the basics. In Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint (1874), Brentano 
distinguishes two senses of the term “conscious” (bewusst). In the active sense of the 
term (henceforth: consciousa), x is said to be consciousness of an object. In the passive 
sense (henceforth: consciousp), x is said to be an object of consciousness.5 Brentano’s 
theory of consciousness is centred on two theses (see Brentano 1995a, Book 2). The first 
says that every mental phenomenon (or mental act) is consciousa; the second says that 
every mental phenomenon is consciousp. In this framework, Brentano puts forward 
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the double relation claim (henceforth: DRC), which is at the core of his theory of con-
sciousness: 
 
(DRC) Every mental phenomenon involves an intentional relation to something dis-
tinct from itself, and an intentional relation to itself. 
 
Consider a mental phenomenon like hearing a sound: first, it involves an intentional 
relation to the sound, which is a physical phenomenon (see Brentano 1995a, passim); 
and second, it involves an intentional relation to itself. In Brentano’s terms, the hearing 
has a “primary object,” which is the sound, and a “secondary object,” which is itself 
(see, e.g., Brentano 1995a, p. 98). Accordingly, Brentano also speaks of primary con-
sciousness and secondary consciousness. Brentano’s alternative name for secondary con-
sciousness is “inner consciousness” (see especially Brentano 1995a, Book 2, ch. 2). This 
consciousness is (at least)6 twofold: it is not just a presentation of x, but it is also a 
judgement (Urteil) about x.7 
It should be noted that DRC is only a rough (i.e. non-technical) formulation of Bren-
tano’s theory of consciousness. Moving from such a formulation, some scholars read 
Brentano’s theory as follows (see, e.g., Caston 2002, pp. 791–792; Borsato 2009a, pp. 52–
54): in hearing a sound, there are many consciousnesses involved, but only one mental 
phenomenon. They seem to mean that while consciousnesses are individuated by their 
objects (i.e. if there are two objects, then there are two consciousnesses), mental phe-
nomena are not individuated by their objects (one single mental phenomenon can have 
two objects). More formally, the two relevant claims can be stated as follows: if a con-
sciousness C has x as object, and a consciousness C' has y as object, and x ≠ y, then C ≠ 
C'; by contrast, it is not the case that if a mental phenomenon M has x as object, and a 
mental phenomenon M' has y as object, and x ≠ y, then M ≠ M'. Borsato (2009a, pp. 52–
54) fleshes out the second claim. He states that although objects in general presuppose 
mental phenomena, secondary objects presuppose only the mental phenomenon 
through which primary objects appear. While two primary objects presuppose two 
mental phenomena, one primary object and one secondary object appear through one 
and the same mental phenomenon. Thus, secondary consciousness requires the per-
forming of a mental act, but it is not itself a mental act.  
It should be noted that the foregoing reconstruction is based on a semantic distinc-
tion between “consciousness” and “mental phenomenon” which is absent in Brenta-
no’s texts. Indeed, there are exegetical reasons for claiming that, for Brentano, “mental 
phenomenon” and “consciousness” are extensionally equivalent (see also Hossack 
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2006, pp. 40–41). He expressly states that “consciousness” is a “synonymous” (gleich-
bedeutend) expression for “mental phenomenon,”8 and defines primary and secondary 
consciousnesses as “partial phenomena” (Theilphänomene).9 An exposition of Brenta-
no’s theory which does not use the above-mentioned distinction is the following. In 
hearing a sound, two partial mental phenomena are involved, but only one total mental 
phenomenon is involved―and here one can replace “mental phenomenon” with “con-
sciousness.” As regards hearing a sound, one partial mental phenomenon is an outer 
perception (i.e. a perception of a physical phenomenon), the other partial mental phe-
nomenon is an inner perception (i.e. a perception of a mental phenomenon), and the 
total mental phenomenon is the hearing. The upshot is that DRC deserves a refined 
formulation: 
 
(DRC*) Every mental phenomenon like hearing a sound is a phenomenon which is 
composed of two partial mental phenomena: one is called primary conscious-
ness, which involves an intentional relation to something distinct from the 
mental phenomenon, whereas the other is called secondary consciousness, 
which involves an intentional relation to the mental phenomenon itself. 
 
How is DRC* to be presented in systematic terms? At a general level, the question is 
how to construe the relationships between primary consciousness, secondary con-
sciousness, and phenomena such as hearing a sound. At a specific level, the question is 
how to interpret the claim that primary and secondary consciousness are to phenom-
ena like hearing a sound as partial phenomena are to a total phenomenon. These are 
the key questions for those who would attempt a systematic reconstruction of Bren-
tano’s theory of consciousness. 
 
3   Three reconstructions of Brentano’s theory 
 
The statements that Brentano makes can give rise to three different reconstructions of 
his theory of consciousness. This section aims to provide the details of each of these 
reconstructions and to identify their virtues and shortcomings. Let us call primary con-







3.1   The identity reconstruction 
 
Consider the following two statements from the Psychology. First, Brentano states that 
“[i]t is only by considering a mental phenomenon in its relation to two different objects 
that we dismember (zergliedern) it conceptually (begrifflich) into two consciousnesses” 
(Brentano 1995a, p. 98), that is, C1 and C2. Second, he states that “every mental act” can 
be “considered” (betrachtet) “under different aspects (Seite)” (Brentano 1995a, p. 119), 
that is, as C1 or as C2. 
Focusing on these statements, Kriegel (2018a, 2018b, pp. 28–43) proposes to read 
Brentano’s account of consciousness in light of a Fregean concept of identity: one and 
the same mental phenomenon can be framed either as primary consciousness or as 
secondary consciousness. “C1” and “C2” would then be to the mental phenomenon as 
“Morning Star” and “Evening Star” are to the planet Venus. Though there are two 
senses, they have the same reference. Kriegel argues for his interpretation by invoking 
Brentano’s mereology. He reads Brentano’s first statement as follows: C1 and C2 are 
parts only in thought, that is, they are merely conceptual parts.10 Kriegel claims that this is 
what Brentano means when he states that C1 and C2 are “distinctional parts” or “divi-
sives” (divisiva). Ultimately, Kriegel’s dual-framing model is quite sophisticated (or 
“impressionistic,” in his own words): on the one hand, C1 and C2 are meant to exist 
only as (partial) ways of framing a mental phenomenon, and as such―that is, as de-
scriptions―they are not identical. On the other hand, C1 and C2 are meant to be (partial) 
descriptions of one and the same entity (the hearing, for example), and in this sense, they 
are identical.11 Since C1 and C2 make up M (indeed, Brentano never mentions further 
partial phenomena of M), C1 = C2 implies that C1 = C2 = M. 
The identity reconstruction is contentious, both from an exegetical and a systematic 
point of view. On the exegetical level, the identity reconstruction turns out to be based 
on a highly disputable reading of Brentano’s mereology.12 Let us see why. Brentano 
(1933, 1995a, 1995b) distinguishes between separable parts and distinctional parts, also 
called “divisives.” A part α is separable (ablösbar) from a part β if and only if α can 
continue to be real even if β has ceased to be real (see, e.g., Brentano 1995b, pp. 15–17). 
If x does not have separable parts, then x is an element. However, elements can be said 
to have further parts; these are distinctional parts. Parts α and β are distinctional parts 
with respect to each other if and only if α is not separable from β and β is not separable 
from α. As an example of divisives, Brentano mentions the two halves of a (mereolog-
ical, non-physical) atom: in an atom, we can “distinguish” (unterscheiden) one half from 
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the other, but we cannot separate the first half from the second, and vice versa (see, 
e.g., Brentano 1995b, pp. 23–24). Or better still: we can separate them only in thought. 
Now, the identity reconstruction is at odds with two laws of Brentano’s mereology. 
The first law is that a part α of x cannot be identified either with a part β of x, or with 
x.13 Precisely on this basis, Brentano explicitly denies that C1 and C2 are identical.14 The 
second law is that distinctional parts or divisives are not parts only in thought (or 
merely conceptual parts), but rather are real parts―that is, parts in reality―which are 
separable only in thought.15 Unlike what is envisaged by Kriegel’s reconstruction, Bren-
tano does not deny the real existence of divisives; rather, he denies the real separability 
of divisives. To some extent, Brentano’s first statement lends itself to such a reconstruc-
tion: we can “dismember” M―that is, we can separate its parts―only “conceptually,” 
that is, only in considering the two partial phenomena which are involved in it. 
On the systematic level, the thesis of the identity reconstruction leads to (at least) 
two infelicitous consequences. To see the first one, consider Brentano’s conception of 
the judgements of C2.16 According to him, these judgements are always positive. In 
making a positive judgement about x, we acknowledge x, and thereby accept x’s exist-
ence. By contrast, in making a negative judgement about x, we reject x, and thereby 
deny x’s existence (see Brandl and Textor 2018). In Brentano’s notation, “God+” ex-
presses a positive judgement, namely, a judgement by which we acknowledge God, 
whereas “God–” expresses a negative judgement, namely, one by which we reject God 
(see Brentano 1956). Hence, C2 is the mental phenomenon by which we acknowledge M 
(and thereby accept its existence). Now, suppose that you judge God negatively. In 
that case, C1 is a rejection (namely, C1 rejects something). So one may argue as follows: 
C1 = C2; C1 is a negative judgement; C2 is a positive judgement; therefore, C2 is at the 
same time a positive and a negative judgement.17 Since the third premise is part and 
parcel of Brentano’s conception of C2 and the conclusion is absurd, the thesis of the 
identity reconstruction is false. For Brentano allows for the view that I can both ac-
knowledge and reject one and the same x at the same time―for example, when I mis-
trust my senses (see Brandl and Textor 2018)―but it does not allow for the view that 
one and the same x can be at the same time both an acknowledgement and a rejection 
(see also Textor 2006, p. 423).  
The second infelicitous conclusion to which the thesis of the identity reconstruction 
leads can be seen when considering the Brentanian view of inner perception. Accord-
ing to Brentano, this kind of perception is (self-)evident. On the epistemological level, 
that inner perception is evident means that the judgements of C2 cannot be false.18 On 
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the ontological level, that inner perception is evident means that what is acknowl-
edged by C2 is necessarily real (wirklich).19 Unlike the objects of inner perception, the 
objects of outer perception do not possess real existence; this is why Brentano calls out-
er perception “blind” (see, e.g., Brentano 1995a, p. 72). Now, some scholars (see Hos-
sack 2006, pp. 52–54; Textor 2006, p. 422) have argued that the thesis of the identity 
reconstruction straightforwardly satisfies the claim that inner perception is (self-)evi-
dent. They reason as follows: on the epistemological level, if C2 = M, then trivially, the 
truth of the judgement of C2 is guaranteed; on the ontological level, if C2 = M, then 
trivially, if C2 is real then M is real. On a closer look, however, this is not the case. Not 
only does the thesis of the identity reconstruction lead to unpalatable consequences, it 
also turns out to be incompatible with the evidence claim. This can be easily demon-
strated. Recall that C2 = M follows from C1 = C2, and consider the case of hearing a 
sound. In such a case, C1 is blind. Again, a quick argument runs as follows: C1 = C2; C1 
is blind; C2 is evident; therefore, C2 is at the same time evident and blind; therefore, C2 
is at the same time evident and not evident, for evidence and blindness are mutually 
exclusive. Furthermore, by the principle of the indiscernibility of identicals, we con-
clude that C2 is not evident.20 
 
3.2   The constituency reconstruction 
 
Consider the following statement from the Psychology: C1 “contributes innerly to the 
being” of C2 (see Brentano 1995a, p. 98). If we translate Brentano’s vague statement in-
to the language of mereology, or better still, if we rephrase “contributes innerly to the 
being of” with “is part of,” we obtain the thesis that C1 is part of C2. Taking inspiration 
from Textor (2006, p. 418), who calls this thesis the “constituency thesis,” we can refer 
to the relative reconstruction as the constituency reconstruction.21 As Textor (2006, p. 
420) puts it, the constituency reconstruction says that C1 is part of C2 and that both are 
distinctional parts of M.  
Admittedly, the thesis of the constituency reconstruction does not entail the worri-
some consequences that the thesis of the identity reconstruction does. Consider again 
the case in which you judge God negatively. In such a case, C1 is a rejection. The 
constituency reconstruction allows for the following view: since C1 is part of C2, C1 ≠ 
C2 (by Brentano’s mereology). Hence, a mental phenomenon (i.e. C1) is rejection, while 
another mental phenomenon (i.e. C2) is acknowledgement. For analogous reasons, the 
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thesis at issue does not lead to the conclusion that one and the same x is at the same 
time both evident and blind. 
At the systematic level, however, the constituency reconstruction turns out to be 
problematic. As has been already suggested, Brentano takes M to be a whole and C1 
and C2 to be parts of that whole. Moreover, he assumes that M is made up of C1 and 
C2―in fact, he never mentions further partial phenomena of M. In such a framework, 
the thesis of the constituency reconstruction leads to the acceptance of the real exist-
ence of wholes with only one part, for according to it, C1 is part of C2 and C2 is part of 
M.22 But a whole consisting of only one part is an absurdity:23 if there is a whole―x, 
say―then by definition there is a y and a z such that y and z are parts of x and y ≠ z. 
How are we to avoid ascribing to Brentano the absurd idea of a whole with only one 
part? We will see that shortly. 
 
3.3   The unity reconstruction 
 
What we are after is a reconstruction of the relationship between C1, C2, and M. We 
are also aiming to develop a reconstruction which avoids implicitly ascribing to Bren-
tano unpalatable claims. The only reconstruction which meets these requirements, I 
submit, is what I call the unity reconstruction. It holds that both C1 and C2 are real parts 
of M. More accurately, it holds that C1 is part of M, C2 is part of M, and both are 
distinctional parts of M. 
From an exegetical point of view, the unity reconstruction turns out to be the best 
candidate to express Brentano’s account of consciousness. For while the previous two 
reconstructions are mostly inferred from some (few!) statements by Brentano, the unity 
reconstruction is based on a claim that Brentano treats at length. Indeed, chapter 4 of 
Book 2 of the Psychology and chapter 2 of Descriptive Psychology (1887) are dedicated 
mainly to a systematic presentation of C1 and C2 as distinctional parts of the mental 
phenomenon in question. 
From a systematic point of view, the unity reconstruction is not as problematic as 
the other two. First, the thesis of the unity reconstruction does not entail the worrisome 
consequences that the thesis of the identity reconstruction does. By describing the 
hearing as a (total) mental act which is composed of two (real) subacts―in other words, 
by stating that C1 ≠ C2, C1 ≠ M, and C2 ≠ M―one can avoid saying that one and the 
same x is at the same time both evident and blind, and that one and the same x is at 
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the same time both acceptance and denial.24 Second, the thesis of the unity reconstruc-
tion does not lead to the worrisome consequences that the thesis of the constituency 
reconstruction does. Unlike the latter, the thesis of the unity reconstruction does not 
say that C1 is to C2 as a part α of x is to x; rather, it says that C1 is to C2 as a part α of x is 
to a part β of x. Thus, it does not lead us to the acceptance of the real existence of a 
whole with only one part. 
To get a better grasp of the kind of relationship involved when considering hearing 
a sound from the point of view of the unity reconstruction, we have to distinguish 
between the relationships that are part-whole relationships and those that are not part-
whole relationships. The first group includes the relationship between C1 and M (for 
the consciousness of the sound is part of the hearing) and the relationship between C2 
and M (for the consciousness of the hearing is part of the hearing). The second group 
includes the relationship between the secondary object of M and M (for the secondary 
object of the hearing is the hearing itself), the relationship between the primary object of 
M and M (for the sound is not part of the hearing),25 the relationship between C1 and 
C2 (for the consciousness of the sound is not part of the consciousness of the hearing 
and the consciousness of the hearing is not part of the consciousness of the sound), the 
relationship between the object of C1 and C1 (for the sound is not part of the conscious-
ness of the sound), and the relationship between the object of C1 and C2 (for the sound 
is not part of the consciousness of the hearing). In the next section, I shall explore this 
last relationship. 
 
4   The threat of the duplication of the primary object 
 
The usual view in the scholarly literature is that Brentano’s master argument for his 
theory of consciousness is an infinite regress argument (see, e.g., Smith 1986, p. 149; 
Kriegel 2003, p. 111; Hossack 2006, pp. 38–39). According to this received view, Bren-
tano argues roughly as follows: if a certain relationship between C1, C2, and M did not 
hold―namely, if they were not identical or at least suitably unified―then we would 
face an infinite regress of mental phenomena, which is plausibly assumed to be an 
intolerable result. Yet as Textor (2017a, p. 55) acutely notes, Brentano’s first concern in 
developing a theory of consciousness is not the threat of infinite regress, but rather 
what we call―somewhat impressionistically―the threat of the duplication of the primary 
object.26 Accordingly, Brentano’s master argument for his theory of consciousness is 
the so-called duplication argument.  
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Here is the duplication argument unpacked (see also Textor 2017a, pp. 55–56 for a 
similar reconstruction). Assume that C1 and C2 are distinct entities, and hence are two 
consciousnesses: 
 
(i) C1 ≠ C2. 
(ii) If x is consciousp both in C and C', and C ≠ C', then x is consciousp twice. 
(iii) The sound is consciousp both in C1 and C2. 
(iv) ∴ The sound is consciousp twice. [from (i), (ii), and (iii)] 
 
Since Brentano takes (iv) to be contrary our experience―indeed, we perceive the sound 
only once―he has to identify a culprit. According to Textor (2017a, b), Brentano rejects 
(i). In other words, he holds that Brentano’s way out to the problem of the duplication 
of the primary object is the thesis of the identity reconstruction: C1 and C2 are the same 
mental phenomenon. He also holds that the thesis of the identity reconstruction is the 
only thesis which allows us to avoid the duplication.27 
Three questions are in order. First: does Brentano avoid the threat of the duplication 
of the primary object by resorting to the thesis of the identity reconstruction? Second: 
can Brentano avoid this threat? Third: is the thesis of the identity reconstruction the 
only thesis which avoids this threat? Before answering these questions, let us examine 
all the premises of the duplication argument.  
First, premise (i). In opening the discussion about the threat of duplication,28 Bren-
tano poses the following question: as regards hearing, do we have many (and diverse) 
consciousnesses? His reply is sophisticated: if we want to determine the number (and 
variety) of consciousnesses according to the number (and variety) of mental phenomena, 
then the answer is no; but if we want to determine the number (and variety) of con-
sciousnesses according to the number (and variety) of objects, then the answer is yes. 
This reply can be reconciled with DRC/DRC*: in answering no, Brentano wants to say 
that the hearing, as a total mental phenomenon, is only one consciousness; in answering 
yes, Brentano wants to say that C1 and C2, as partial mental phenomena of the hearing, 
are two consciousnesses. This complies with the mereological assumptions on which 
the thesis of the unity reconstruction relies: C1 and C2 are conceived of as divisives (of 
the mental phenomenon), and a divisive of x cannot be identical either with x or with 
another divisive of x. 
Now consider (ii). It is major premise that can also be phrased as follows: if a con-
sciousness C has x as object, and a consciousness C' has x as object, and C and C' are 
two consciousness, then x is presented twice. This premise is not stated explicitly by 
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Brentano, but he (Brentano 1995a, p. 98) does explicitly contend that the conjunction 
of (i) and (iii) creates the duplication of the primary object. Why? Because he implicitly 
endorses (ii). 
So we come to (iii). Brentano (1995a, p. 103) formulates it in two ways: first, he says 
that the object of C1 is “also presented” in C2; and second, he says that the object of C1 
“also belongs to the content of” C2.29 This latter formulation raises the question as to 
whether (iii) has to be read in mereological terms. That is: should we interpret it as say-
ing that the object of C1 is part of C2? I contend that Brentano would answer negatively, 
for if the sound were a part of C2, then the real existence of C2 would entail the real 
existence of the sound (for in Brentano’s mereology the real existence of x entails the 
real existence of all of the parts of x; see Brentano 1995a, p. 71) However, this is not the 
case: when I hallucinate the sound, my consciousness of the (non-veridical) hearing 
really exists, but the sound does not really exist. What Brentano has in mind in this 
context, I take it, is not a content in a mereological sense, but rather a content in an in-
tentional sense: the sound is the object of C1, but it is also the object of C2. We can also 
say that C2 has access both to M and to the primary object of M, and name (iii) the dou-
ble access claim. (For the sake of clarity, “x has access to y,” “y is the object of x,” and “y 
is consciousp in x” are synonymous expressions). 
At this stage, a brief systematic analysis of the double access claim is in order. It has 
been rightly observed that it is a debatable claim and therefore in need of argument 
(see Textor 2017a, p. 56). One is tempted to derive it as follows. Since C2 is directed 
towards M in its totality (see, e.g., Brentano 1995a, p. 100), and C1 is a (distinctional) 
part of M (by the thesis of the unity reconstruction), then C2 is also directed towards 
C1―assuming that the consciousness of M is also directed towards the parts of M.30 
One could next point out that the consciousness of the consciousness of a sound is a 
presentation of the presentation of a sound and recall that a presentation of the presen-
tation of a sound is inconceivable without a presentation of the sound―a thesis that 
Brentano (1995a, p. 98) himself endorses. Indeed, one cannot think about a thought 
about the sound without also thinking about the sound. From all this, one could try to 
conclude that C2 is also directed towards (i.e. about) the sound. The argument, how-
ever, will not work. The fact that one cannot think about a thought about x without 
also thinking about x does not entail that the thought about the thought about x is (also) 
about x (i.e. that one and the same thought is about both the thought about x and about 
x). Even granted that the existence of the presentation of the presentation of the sound 
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entails the existence of the presentation of the sound, it does not follow that the pre-
sentation of the presentation of the sound is (also) about the sound. 
Now on to the three questions mentioned above. As for the question whether Bren-
tano avoids the threat of the duplication by resorting to the thesis of the identity re-
construction, one should note that he (1995a, pp. 97–98) states that if C1 and C2 were 
not “connected” “in such a peculiarly intimate way” that the “being” of one “at the 
same time contributes innerly to the being of the other,” then the sound would be con-
sciousp twice―with respect to C1 as an “explicit (ausschliesslicher) object” and with re-
spect to C2 as an “implicit (eingeschlossener) object.”31 Are these terms to be interpreted 
in the sense that Brentano’s solution to the problem is the view that C1 and C2 are the 
same mental phenomenon―that is, the thesis of the identity reconstruction? Nothing 
seems to force us in such a direction. Indeed, Brentano’s impressionistic words (“con-
nection,” “contribution”) make us think rather of the other two theses we have consid-
ered, namely, the thesis of the constituency reconstruction and the thesis of the unity 
reconstruction. 
So we come to our second question: whether Brentano can avoid the threat of du-
plication of the primary object. In this regard, one can easily see that neither the thesis 
of the constituency reconstruction nor the thesis of the unity reconstruction is a way 
out to the problem of duplication. Indeed, on both reconstructions, C1 and C2 turn out 
to be two consciousnesses. On the constituency reconstruction, since C1 is to C2 as a 
part of x is to x, then C1 ≠ C2; on the unity reconstruction, since C1 is to C2 as a (distinc-
tional) part α of x is to a (distinctional) part β of x, then C1 ≠ C2. And if C1 and C2 are 
two consciousnesses and the sound is consciousp both in C1 and C2, then the sound is 
consciousp twice. To avoid the duplication of the primary object, one could discard (i) 
or (ii) or (iii). However, there seems to be no way that any of them can be discarded, 
for (i) and (ii) are cornerstones of Brentano’s theory, and (iii) is taken by the Brentano 
(1995a, p. 94) of the Psychology to be “evident” (einleuchtend). Of course, the thesis of 
the identity reconstruction would avoid the threat of duplication right away, but, as I 
have argued, it is not Brentano’s theory. It seems therefore that Brentano cannot avoid 
what he takes to be the main threat to a theory of consciousness. 
There is, however, a viable alternative, one that is offered by Brentano himself. In a 
later writing―specifically, a letter to Anton Marty dated March 17, 1905—he goes back 
to the intentional structure of the two partial consciousnesses in question. In this text, 
he proceeds negatively: he puts the emphasis on what C1 and C2 are not directed to-
wards. Regarding C1, he states that its object is not what is referred to as “presented 
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sound,” but rather the sound itself. Regarding C2, he states that its object is not the 
sound, but rather what is referred to as “presented sound.”32 I do not have the space 
to elucidate the notion of “presented sound,”33 but for the present purpose, what mat-
ters is that such a view expressly denies that C2 also has access to the primary object of 
the relevant mental phenomenon. In Brentano’s (2009b, p. 53) own words, “what are 
experienced as primary objects […] are never themselves the objects of inner percep-
tion.” Hence, on such a view, only one consciousness has access to the sound, and this 
consciousness is C1. This view is confirmed by a passage in Descriptive Psychology. Here 
Brentano (1995b, p. 27) compares and contrasts the case of C1 and C2 with the case of 
positive quality and evidence of the judgement “There is a truth,” and writes that 
while in the latter case we find two parts which share an object―that is, they are di-
rected towards one and the same thing, namely, the truth―in the former we do not. In 
such a framework, (iii) does not hold, and thus no vicious duplication arises. 
We are finally in a position to answer our third question, namely: is the thesis of the 
identity reconstruction the only thesis that can protect Brentano’s theory from the 
threat of the duplication of the primary object? The answer is no, for the thesis of the 
unity reconstruction in itself does not engender the duplication. For the duplication to 
arise, the view of C1 and C2 as distinct has to be coupled with the double access claim. 
At some point, Brentano rejects such a claim while still retaining the thesis of the unity 
reconstruction. 
 
5   Closing remarks 
 
As I said in the introduction, the problems Brentano ran into in exploring the mind are 
also problems that contemporary views might face. In particular, they may threaten 
views such as higher-order theories and structured self-representationalism.34 On both 
of these views, states like hearing a sound are conscious in virtue of being the object of 
a second-order mental state. And again on both views, a second-order mental state is 
distinct from a first-order mental state: on the self-representationalist variant, a sec-
ond-order mental state and a first-order mental state are proper parts of a (complex) 
state; on the higher-order variant, the two states not only are distinct, but do not even 
form anything at all.  
What is the moral these theorists should draw from a systematic reconstruction of 
Brentano’s theory of consciousness―specifically, from a systematic reconstruction of 
the duplication argument? Unlike what has been suggested (see Textor 2017b, pp. 123–
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130), I think that the moral is not that the second-order state and the first-order state 
are to be conceived as one and the same―a view that faces several difficulties on its 
own (see notably Rosenthal 2005). The moral they should draw is rather, I submit, that 
they should avoid conceiving of the higher-order state as also directed towards the 
object of the lower-order state. As long as they do not commit themselves to such a 
view, their theory is not exposed to a vicious duplication of aboutness. 
 
Notes 
1 By “systematic reconstruction” I mean more or less what is commonly referred to as “rational recon-
struction.” This is to be contrasted with historical reconstruction in the following way: “The objective of 
historical reconstruction is ‘fidelity’ to the author in question. Though rational reconstruction also aims 
at fidelity, it must first of all be ‘relevant,’ that is, it should be done in such a way that the positions it 
explains are made available to be discussed by contemporary philosophers.” (Taieb 2018, p. 194) 
2 See, e.g., Brentano (1995b, p. 25): “Every consciousness, upon whatever object it is primarily directed, 
is concomitantly directed upon itself.” 
3 See Brentano (1995a, p. 98; translation slightly modified): “We can say that the sound is the primary 
object of the act of hearing, and that the act of hearing itself is the secondary object. Indeed, temporally 
they both occur at the same time, but according to its nature, the sound is prior. A presentation of the 
sound without a presentation of the act of hearing would not be inconceivable, at least prima facie, but a 
presentation of the act of hearing without a presentation of the sound would be an obvious contradic-
tion. The act of hearing appears to be directed toward sound in the most proper sense of the term, and 
because of this it seems to apprehend itself incidentally and additionally.” 
4 The reconstruction that I will defend is not novel. That of Alfred Kastil (1951, p. 47), a disciple of 
Brentano, is similar.  
5 See Brentano (1995a, p. 79, note): “We use the term ‘unconscious’ in two ways. First, in an active sense, 
speaking of a person who is not conscious of a thing; secondly, in a passive sense, speaking of a thing 
of which we are not conscious.” 
6 In fact, for the early Brentano secondary consciousness is threefold, for it is also an emotion (Gefühl) 
regarding x (see, e.g, Brentano 1995a, p. 120). On this aspect, which I shall leave aside, I refer the reader 
to Kriegel (2017).  
7 See, e.g., Brentano (1995b, p. 89): “The secondary relation is a presenting and a judging, [or] believing, 
which [is] simply assertoric, yet evident.” 
8 See Brentano (1995a, p. 78): “We must have a case of the latter sort before us in the dispute about the 
meaning of the term ‘consciousness,’ if it is not to be viewed as mere idle quibbling over words. […] I 
prefer to use it as synonymous with ‘mental phenomenon,’ or ‘mental act.’” 
9 See Brentano (1995a, p. 120; translation slightly modified): “The consciousness of the primary object 





phenomena of one and the same unitary phenomenon. […] We interpreted them, and had to interpret 
them, as parts of a unified real being.” 
10 A very similar reading is defended by Textor (2017a, pp. 56–57, 2017b, pp. 115–130), though his read-
ing is motivated by reflections on the duplication argument. I will discuss this argument in Section 4.  
11 See Kriegel (2018a, p. 92): “We might therefore say, doubtless somewhat impressionistically, that qua 
regarded the awareness and the awareness-of-awareness are different, even though in and of them-
selves they are identical.” Kriegel’s reading is expressly inspired by Hugo Bergmann’s (1908, p. 12). On 
the latter, C1 and C2 are “individually” (individuell) identical but “conceptually” (begrifflich) distinct. 
12 On Brentano’s mereology, see Baumgartner and Simons (1994) and Kriegel (2018a, pp. 85–90, 2018b, 
pp. 32–37). On Brentano’s mereology of consciousness, see Albertazzi (2006, pp. 131–143), Borsato 
(2009b, pp. 39–44), Dewalque (2013, pp. 458–459), Giustina (2017, pp. 29–30), Kriegel (2018a, pp. 90–93, 
2018b, pp. 37–40), and Marchesi (2019, pp. 138–140). 
13 More accurately, Brentano subscribes to the following theses. First, if x is a part of y, then x ≠ y. Second, 
if x and z are parts of y, then x ≠ z. 
14 See Brentano (1995a, p. 124): “And it is clear that such real identity never holds between our concur-
rent mental activities, and that it will never be found between the diverse aspects of the simplest mental 
acts which were differentiated earlier. […] [A] divisive, which I distinguish as a part in a real thing, 
cannot be called identical with this thing and hence with the other divisives which can be distinguished 
in it. A divisive never stands in a relation of real identity with another which has been distinguished 
from it, for if it did it would not be another divisive but the same one.” It is worth pointing out that in 
this context Brentano opts for the term “divisive” instead of “part” only because he considers the latter 
equivocal; see Brentano (1995a, p. 121).  
15 See Brentano (1995b, p. 18; emphasis mine): “In the blue spot one must therefore distinguish a partic-
ularity of colour and a particularity of place. These particularities are thus really (wirklich) contained in 
it, [they] are distinctional parts of them.” and Brentano (1995b, p. 27; translation slightly modified): “The 
sensing of the colour and the concomitant sensing of this sensing are directed towards different objects. 
The present case is, in this respect, similar to those separable parts which we discerned earlier in the 
mental domain, like, e.g., seeing and hearing and simultaneous seeing of different parts of one and the 
same picture. Whereas the separation of the parts considered there can only be actual, the parts consid-
ered here can only be separated distinctionally. This is why, having referred to the former as actually 
separable mental parts, it was probably not wholly inappropriate to call the latter inseparable (distinc-
tional) ones.” 
16 Brentano’s theory of judgement is peculiar in that it does not take judgements to be propositional 
attitudes. According to Brentano, we judge (acknowledge or reject) things, not that things are thus-and-so 
(see Textor 2006, p. 414, 2013, pp. 470–471; Brandl and Textor 2018).  
17 Here I formalize an argument that was originally elaborated by Textor (2006, p. 424) against Soldati 
(2005, p. 68), who claims that as regards C2 and M “there are not two items to count.” I take it for granted 
that if “d” and “d*” are two (partial) descriptions of one and the same entity, then if “d is F” is true, “d* is 
F” is true as well. For example, if “The morning star is bright” is true, “The evening star is bright” is 




18 See, e.g., Brentano (1995a, p. 26): “As everyone knows, memory is, to a great extent, subject to illusion, 
while inner perception is infallible and does not admit of doubt.” And Brentano (2009a, p. 13): “One 
gets into further difficulties if one takes into account in addition to outer perception, which is lacking in 
evidence, also inner perception, which admits of no illusion.” 
19 See Brentano (1995a, p. 70): “We said that mental phenomena are those phenomena which alone can 
be perceived in the strict sense of the word. We could just as well say that they are those phenomena 
which alone possess real existence as well as intentional existence. Knowledge, joy and desire really 
exist. Color, sound and warmth have only a phenomenal and intentional existence.” 
20 Following Hossack (2006, pp. 54–55), who in turn moves from a Kimian notion of events, it may be 
argued on a non-Brentanian basis that the identity C1 = C2 leads to another difficulty. One may reason 
as follows. An event is an instantiation of a certain relation in a certain order by certain particulars, and 
two events are identical if and only if exactly the same property or relation is instantiated by exactly the 
same things in exactly the same order. Now, let C1 be the event of the perception of a sound x by a 
subject S, and let C2 be the event of the perception of the hearing of x by S. Let “p” express the perceptual 
relation and let “M” stand for the hearing in question. We write the two events as ⟨p, S, x⟩ and ⟨p, S, M⟩ 
respectively. By the criterion for the identity of events, it follows that x = M; but this is false, since the 
sound is not identical to the hearing.  
21 See Textor (2006, pp. 418–419): “[T]he object of the higher-order act, i.e. the lower-order act, is one of 
its constituents. […] [T]he higher-order presentation contains the lower-order presentation it is about 
[…]” 
22 On another occasion, Textor (2006, p. 420) seems to formulate a reading which is more intrepid than 
the foregoing one. He says not only that C1 is part of C2, but also that C2 is part of C1 (this latter assertion 
can also be found in Smith et al. 1982, p. 30). However, this is never stated by Brentano; what he repeat-
edly says is rather that C2 is part of M. Moreover, the view on which x is part of y and y is part of x is 
simply a further asbsurdity. 
23 The absurdity of wholes with only one part is recognized in Textor (2017b, p. 127). 
24 Another question is whether the thesis of the unity reconstruction also satisfies the claim that inner 
perception is evident (for example, the claim that if we perceive hearing a sound, then we hear a sound). 
Brentano (1995a, p. 109) himself calls for a model of the evidence of inner perception. In this regard, one 
may say that the thesis of the unity reconstruction does not guarantee enough. The reasons for this are 
as follows. True, divisives are not really separable: whenever C1 is there, C2 is there, and vice versa. Still, 
such a claim does not rule out that we can conceive of C2 without C1―and hence without M. Indeed, 
divisives are separable in thought. In other words, the view of C1 and C2 as divisives of M does not 
imply that C2 entails the real existence of M. But such an entailment is exactly what one needs to satisfy 
the evidence claim. In Brentano’s (2009b, p. 89) words: “A man can be said to have direct, affirmative, 
and therefore factual evidence concerning the existence of a thing only if it would be contradictory to 
say that, although he is thinking of the thing, the thing does not exist.” Now, for all that the thesis of the 
unity reconstruction says, a sentence like “C2 is real and C1 is not real” is not a contradiction. In order to 
satisfy the evidence claim, one could claim that M is part of C2, for as Brentano (1995a, p. 71) himself 




the unity reconstruction does not say that M is part of C2. In conclusion, the thesis of the unity recon-
struction does not violate the claim that inner perception is evident (for it does not say that C2 is con-
ceivable without M), but does not satisfy it either. 
25 For Brentano, the sound is part of the hearing only in a “modified” (i.e. improper) sense. In Brentanian 
mereology, x is a part of y if and only if x is properly (i.e. really) in y; by contrast, x is a part of y in a 
modified sense if and only if x is not properly (i.e. not really) in y. See especially Brentano (1995b, pp. 
28–30), Borsato (2009b, pp. 39–44), and Marchesi (2019, p. 138). 
26 Both the infinite regress problem and the problem of the duplication of the primary object concern 
something contrary to experience, but they are orthogonal with respect to each other: a theory of con-
sciousness can run into the former without running into the latter, and vice versa. On the Brentanian 
theory of consciousness and the infinite regress problem, see Küng (1978, pp. 172–174), Textor (2006, 
pp. 424–430), and Marchesi (2019, pp. 140–145). 
27 See Textor (2017a, p. 56): “‘Hearing tone F’ and ‘awareness of hearing tone F’ express different con-
cepts of the same act. The act has two objects: the tone and itself. Each concept conceptualises the act 
with respect to one these objects: namely as awareness of the note (hearing) and as awareness of itself 
(awareness of hearing). The concepts are not concepts of two distinct acts that are parts of one complex 
act. For otherwise the note F were [sic] presented twice: once in the subact hearing tone F and then again 
in the subact awareness of hearing tone F.” See also Textor (2017b, pp. 115, 117): “Which lesson can we 
draw from the Duplication Argument? It shows that hearing F and awareness of hearing F are the same 
mental act. […] The act is not the result of a combination of distinct acts each of which refers to one par-
ticular thing. If it were, the double presentation problem would arise.” 
28 See Brentano (1995a, pp. 97–98; translation slightly modified): “Now the question arises, in such a 
case, do we have many and diverse presentations or only a single one? Before answering this question 
we must become clear about whether we want to determine the number and the variety of presentations 
according to the number and variety of objects, or according to the number of mental acts in which the 
objects are presented. On the first alternative it is clear that we must say that in the case under consid-
eration we would have many presentations and that they are of different kinds; so much so that one of 
them constitutes the content of another, while having a physical phenomenon as its own content. If this 
were true, the physical phenomenon must, to a certain extent, belong to the content of both of these 
presentations, to that of one as its explicit object, to that of the other as, so to speak, its implicit object. It 
would seem, therefore, as Aristotle also noted, to turn out that the physical phenomenon must be pre-
sented twice. Yet this is not the case. Rather, inner experience seems to prove undeniably that the 
presentation of the sound is connected with the presentation of the presentation of the sound in such a 
peculiarly intimate way that its being at the same time contributes innerly to the being of the other.” 
29 See Brentano (1995a, p. 103; translation slightly modified; emphasis mine): “If we see a colour and 
have a presentation of our act of seeing, the colour which we see is also presented in the presentation of the 
seeing. This colour is a content of the act of seeing, but it also belongs to the content of the presentation 




30 On the same basis, one could infer that C2 is also directed towards itself. Following Fréchette (2018), 
we can call such directedness “joint self-direction.” Textor (2017b, pp. 120–121) models joint self-direc-
tion on the structure of plural demonstratives. For example, in saying “We will be late,” I am referring 
to a group of people one of whom is me. Analogously, C2 is a part of x which is directed towards x and 
itself together. In this regard, however, Marchesi (2019, pp. 142–143) points out that if one combines the 
thesis of the unity reconstruction with another thesis of Brentano’s framework, namely, that the 
consciousness of x is not identical to the consciousness of a part of x (see, e.g., Brentano 1995b, p. 104), 
the relevant conclusions cannot be drawn. 
31 Compare Textor’s (2017a, p. 56) formulation of the double access claim: “S’s perceiving S perceiving 
x is directly of S’s perceiving x as well as indirectly of x.” 
32 See Brentano (2009b, pp. 52–53; translation slightly modified): “[T]he presentation of a horse does not 
have ‘presented horse’ as object […], but rather ‘horse’ […] The ‘thought horse’ considered as object 
would be the object of inner perception, which the thinker perceives whenever he forms a correlative 
pair consisting of this ‘thought horse’ along with his thinking about the horse; for correlatives are such 
that one cannot be perceived or apprehended without the other. But what are experienced as primary 
objects, or what are thought universally as primary objects of reason, are never themselves the objects 
of inner perception. […] I would like to have it made clear that […] I have always held (in agreement 
with Aristotle) that ‘horse’ and not ‘thought horse’ is the immanent object of those thoughts that pertain 
to horses. Naturally, however, I did say that ‘horse’ is thought by us, and that insofar as we do think of it 
(N.B., insofar as we think of the horse and not of the ‘thought horse’) we have ‘horse’ as (immanent) object.”  
33 On this, see Taieb (2018, esp. Sect. 3.2.3). 
34 I refer to the self-representational theory developed by Kriegel (2009)―the so-called “crooked repre-
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